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ABSTRACT
Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is an important paradigm in display ad-
vertising, where advertisers utilize extended information and al-
gorithms served by Demand Side Platforms (DSPs) to improve
advertising performance. A common problem for DSPs is to help
advertisers gain as much value as possible with budget constraints.
However, advertisers would routinely add certain key performance
indicator (KPI) constraints that the advertising campaign must meet
due to practical reasons. In this paper, we study the common case
where advertisers aim to maximize the quantity of conversions,
and set cost-per-click (CPC) as a KPI constraint. We convert such
a problem into a linear programming problem and leverage the
primal-dual method to derive the optimal bidding strategy. To ad-
dress the applicability issue, we propose a feedback control-based
solution and devise the multivariable control system. The empir-
ical study based on real-word data from Taobao.com verifies the
effectiveness and superiority of our approach compared with the
state of the art in the industry practices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online display advertising has been an increasely significant busi-
ness. According to the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) report,
internet advertising revenues for the full year of 2017 increased
21.4% over 2016 and totaled $88.0 billion in the United States, with
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display advertising1 accounting for approximately $39.4 billion [1].
In online display advertising, advertisers pay a certain price for
the ad opportunity to show their ads. Real-Time Bidding (RTB)[27]
is the most popular paradigm in display advertising. RTB enables
advertisers to bid for the ad opportunity at the impression level,
and the bidder with the highest price wins the opportunity to show
its ad. Specifically, the bid price for each ad opportunity could be
individually different based on its utility and cost, which allows
advertisers to leverage extended information and algorithms served
by DSPs[33].
A common problem for DSPs is to help advertisers gain as much
value as possible within the budget[29]. There has been some bid-
ding strategies and algorithms[6, 29] proposed to maximize the
value from advertising with the budget constraint. Therefore, ad-
vertisers could simply set the budget of the campaign, and DSPs
would calculate the bid price on behalf of advertisers.
However, apart from the budget constraint, advertisers would
routinely add certain key performance indicator (KPI) constraints
that the advertising campaign must meet[14]. Advertisers set such
KPI constraints because the campaign with a single budget con-
straint may suffer from huge changes of the traffic caused by the
volatilities of the bidding environment. For example, the ad opportu-
nities of certain days could become so expensive that the advertiser
cannot afford to spend all budget on them. One solution is con-
stantly adjusting the daily budget to control the investment, which
is costly and even impractical for advertisers. Another solution is
to set certain KPI constraints. Some KPI constraints, such as the
cost-per-mille (CPM) and cost-per-click (CPC) constraints, have
strong influence on the total cost of a campaign. By setting such
KPI constraints, advertisers could cast a restriction on the total
cost and avoid spending all budget when the ad opportunities are
not worthwhile, which frees advertisers from heavy labor on fre-
quently adjusting campaign settings. Furthermore, KPI constraints
also serve as a real-time proxy to regulate the advertising per-
formance. In most cases, advertisers ultimately want conversions.
However, the conversion is sparse and delayed, which prohibits
advertisers to evaluate the advertising performance in real time. As
a result, advertisers use the KPI exposed by DSPs to evaluate the
expected value from advertising and set it as a constraint to ensure
that the performance of advertising is under control.
In this paper, we focus on the CPC constraint, which is one of
the most common KPI constraints[34, 35]. We propose the optimal
bidding strategy that maximizes the quantity of conversions from
advertising under the budget and CPC constraints. In this work,
bid optimization is formulated as a linear programming problem,
and the primal-dual method is leveraged to derive the optimal
1Display-related ad formats include: Banner and Video
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bidding strategy. Our methodology could be generalised to other
cost-related KPI constraints such as the CPM constraint.
Furthermore, we propose the multivariable control system based
on the optimal bidding strategy to address the applicability issue,
particularly the dynamic environment, as we apply the bidding
strategy in the industrial situation. Based on the analysis of the
hyper parameters in the bidding strategy, we claim that the hy-
per parameters have strong control capabilities on achieving cor-
responding constraints, and devise the independent PID control
system. Taking into consideration the coupling effect, we further
improve the performance of the system by proposing the model
predictive control system.
Moreover, the proposed systems are implemented and evaluated
on real industrial datasets. Experiments on the real datasets from
Taobao.com show that the systems have strong control capability
on achieving the constraints. We also compare our approach with
the state of the art in the industry practices, and the result reveals
the superiority of our method. The main contributions of our work
can be summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the optimal bidding strategy that maximizes the
quantity of conversions under the budget and CPC constraints.
(2) We devise the multivariable control system to deal with the
dynamic environment when applying the bidding strategy in
the industrial situation.
(3) Extensive experiments are conducted and the results demon-
strate the advantage of our approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we formulate
the problem and derive the optimal bidding strategy in Section 2.
Section 3 addresses the applicability issue and presents the multi-
variable control system. Experiments and evaluations are conducted
in Section 4, followed by the related work in Section 5. We conclude
our work in Section 6.
2 BIDDING STRATEGY
In this section, we firstly review some preliminary knowledge of
the RTB eco-system, and afterwards formulate the bid optimization
problem. Then we derive the optimal bidding strategy, and take a
discussion on the characteristics of the bidding strategy.
2.1 RTB Eco-system
To make this paper self-contained, we briefly introduce RTB eco-
system and its related techniques. The work flow of RTB is illus-
trated as Fig. 1, and each step is as follows: 1) A user visits an
ad-supported site, and the site sends an ad request to the ad ex-
changer. 2) The ad exchanger initiates an auction and requests bids
from DSPs. 3) DSPs submit the bid price along with the ad to the ad
exchanger on behalf of advertisers. 4) The ad exchanger holds the
auction and charges the winner DSP for the ad opportunity. 5)The
winner’s ad is sent to the site. 6) User feedback afterwards would
be sent back to the corresponding DSP. To avoid redundancy, we
focus on step 3), 4) and 6), which are highly related to our work.
A DSP calculates a bid price for the advertiser by its bidding
strategy when it receives a bid request from the ad exchanger. Since
conversions are the target event of most advertisers, almost all
bidding strategies (including ours) rely heavily on the ability of
learned models to estimate ad click-through rate (CTR) [19] and
Figure 1: RTB Eco-system
conversion rate2 (CVR) [17]. In addition, some DSPs may also base
their bidding strategies on the prediction of the winning price (bid
landscape prediction). CTR/CVR estimation and landscape predic-
tion by themselves are heavily studied problems [28, 32, 37], which
is beyond our scope. Therefore, we just assume the estimation and
prediction problems have been solved, and the expected probability
of the click and conversion could be quantified by CTR and CVR
respectively.
When a DSPwins the opportunity to show the ad in an auction, it
is charged a price. The price is equal to the second highest bid price
under the generalized second price (GSP) auction mechanism [9],
which is widely adopted in industrial platforms. There are also some
other auction mechanisms such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
mecahnism (VCG) [20]. In this paper, without loss of generality,
we base the discussion and formulation on the most common GSP
auction mechanism.
Any feedback on the ad from the user, such as clicks and conver-
sions, would be sent back to the corresponding DSP. The DSP could
utilize such feedbacks to train the prediction models, and timely
adjust its bidding strategy. In addition, such feedbacks would be
integrated and exposed to advertisers by the DSP. In our proposed
system, we take advantage of such feedbacks and continuously
fine tune the bidding strategy across the lifetime of the advertising
campaign.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Suppose there are N ad opportunities in a day, and we index each
ad opportunity by their generated order as opportunityi . Each ad
opportunity has different value for the advertiser, and we use vi to
represent the value of opportunityi for the advertiser. Based on vi ,
the bid price bidi is calculated and submitted to the ad exchanger.
Each ad opportunity has a winning pricewpi . From the perspective
of the advertiser,wpi equals to the highest bid price of other adver-
tisers. If bidi is higher thanwpi , which means that the advertiser
would win the ad opportunity and be chargedwpi under the GSP
auction mechanism, we set xi to be 1, and 0 otherwise. The total
Value andCost of the advertising campaign is formulated as Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2).
Value =
∑
i=1...N
xi · vi (1)
Cost =
∑
i=1...N
xi ·wpi (2)
We formulate CPC in Eq. (3). It is worth noting that we replace
the real click with CTR, which provides us with a more concise
formulation. Such a replacement could largely facilitate our theo-
retical analysis, and has trivial influence in the following practical
2The conversion rate is conditioned on the click
system design.
CPC =
∑
i=1...N
xi ·wpi∑
i=1...N
xi ·CTRi
(3)
The conversion is what advertisers ultimately want. Therefore,
we quantify vi by CTRi · CVRi . Please note that CTRi must be
considered since conversions could only be generated after a click
and CVR is conditioned on a click. We summarize the problem as
follows and formulate it as (LP1).
• We maximize the quantity of conversions with the budget B,
and guarantee that CPC does not exceed a given value C .
max
xi
∑
i=1...N
xi ·CTRi ·CVRi (LP1)
s.t.
∑
i=1...N
xi ·wpi ≤ B (4)∑
i=1...N
xi ·wpi∑
i=1...N
xi ·CTRi
≤ C (5)
where 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,∀i
2.3 Optimal Bidding Strategy
The problem (LP1) is actually a linear programming problem[24],
which is to find the optimal xi to maximize the target function with
the linear constraints. There has been many algorithms proposed
to directly solve such a problem, however, we aim to derive the
optimal bidding strategy instead of the allocation strategy. In other
words, we do not essentially care about the value of xi , but the
underlying bidding strategy that intrinsically affects xi . With such
a consideration, we creatively resort to the primal-dual method.
Every linear programming problem, referred to as a primal problem,
can be converted into a dual problem[8]. In addition, the optimal
primal solution can be obtained by the corresponding dual solution
according to the duality theorem[5]. Such mathematics characteris-
tics shell some insights on us, and we integrate the primal space
and the dual space to derive the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. The optimal bidding strategy formulation is:
bidi =
1
p + q
·CTRi ·CVRi + q
p + q
·CTRi ·C (6)
The optimal bidding strategy is stated in Eq. 6, where p and q are
hyper parameters incorporated from the dual space, and correspond
to the optimal dual solution. We will investigate the properties of p
and q in later sections. For now, we give the proof for Thm. 2.1.
Proof. (LP1) is converted to the dual problem:
min
p,q,ri
B · p +
∑
i=1...N
ri (LP2)
s.t. wpi · p + (wpi −CTRi ·C)q + ri ≥ vi ,∀i (7)
where p ≥ 0,
q ≥ 0,
ri ≥ 0,∀i
vi = CTRi ·CVRi ,∀i
Assume the optimal solution for the primal problem (LP1) is
x∗i ,∀i = 1, ...,n, and the optimal solution of the corresponding dual
problem (LP2) is p∗, q∗, {r∗i |i = 1, ...,n}. According the theorem of
complementary slackness, we obtain:
x∗i · (vi −wpi · p − (wpi −CTRi ·C)q − ri ) = 0,∀i (8)
(x∗i − 1) · r∗i = 0,∀i (9)
We delicately set bid∗i =
1
p∗+q∗CTRi ·CVRi + q
∗
p∗+q∗C ·CTRi ,
then we transform Eq. 8 to Eq. 10:
x∗i · ((bid∗i −wpi )(p∗ + q∗) − r∗i ) = 0,∀i (10)
• According to Eq. (10), if the campaign wins opportunityi , i.e.
x∗i > 0, then (bid∗i −wpi )(p∗ + q∗) − r∗i = 0. Meanwhile, p∗ ≥
0,q∗ ≥ 0, rk ≥ 0, so bid∗i ≥ wpi .• If the campaigns loses opportunityi , i.e. x∗i = 0, we could deduce
from Eq. (9) that r∗i = 0. Therefore, according to Eq. (7), we
obtain (bid∗i −wpi )(p∗ + q∗) ≤ 0, namely bid∗i ≤ wpi .
To sum up, for any opportunityi , the bidding strategy would
guarantee that the xi is optimal, which leads to the optimal solution
of (LP1). That is to say, when the optimal xi is 1 (the campaign
should win opportunityi ), the bid price bidi based on the optimal
bidding strategy is higher thanwpi , which would guarantee that the
campaign wins opportunityi . The reasoning is the same when the
optimal xi is 0. Therefore, the campaign needs just to bid following
the optimal bidding strategy in Eq. (6), and the total advertising
value would be maximized with the constraints. □
It is worth noting that Eq. (6) does not explicitly tell the value
of p and q. Actually, it is easy to derive the optimal p and q by
solving the dual problem with well developed linear programming
algorithms. Such work does not contribute to the comprehension
of our work, so we do not discuss how to calculate the value of p
and q here.
We reformulate the optimal bidding strategy for (LP1) into two
stages as shown in Eq. (11), Eq. (12) and Fig. 2, where c_bidi could
be regarded as the bid price for a click. As an ad opportunity comes,
we first determine the bid price for a click, i.e. c_bidi . After we deter-
mine c_bidi , the final bid price is calculated by multiplying c_bidi
withCTRi , which could be automatically completed and is omitted
in the following discussion. In addition, the cost for a click is natu-
rally no higher than the bid price for a click under the GSP auction
mechanism[9], so that c_bidi is directly related to CPC. Therefore,
we focus the discussion on the bid price for a click (c_bidi ) instead
(a) c_bidi (b) bidi
Figure 2: Optimal bidding strategy
of the final bid price to facilitate our demonstrations.
c_bidi =
1
p + q
·CVRi + q
p + q
·C (11)
bidi = c_bidi ·CTRi (12)
= ( 1
p + q
·CVRi + q
p + q
·C) ·CTRi
We start the discussion on the optimal bidding strategy with
some obvious facts as illustrated in Fig. 2a. Firstly, the bid price
for a click is strictly positive related to CVRi . It does make sense
that we should give a higher bid price for a more valuable click,
and a lower price for a less valuable click. Secondly, the bid price is
linear against CVRi . It is a natural result since we are maximizing
the sum of the value, which is a linear function against CVRi itself.
Thirdly, the bidding strategy would definitely cross two points as
emphasized in the figure. We shall discuss it in details in later anal-
ysis. However, there is an unusual fact: unlike the widely adopted
bidding strategies [21, 34], the function does not necessarily get
through the origin. Specifically, the bid price would be non-zero
even though the ad opportunity has no value for the advertiser. It is
a little bit unintuitive that we bid a non-zero price for an ad oppor-
tunity without value. We state the reason as follows: considering
a CPC constraint is given, the bidding strategy tries to win some
cheap ad opportunity, even without any value, to lower the overall
CPC, and thus to win some valuable ad opportunity with high CPC.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we address the applicability issue of the bidding
strategy in the industrial scenario, and propose the feedback control-
based solution. Based on the analysis of the hyper parameters in
the optimal bidding strategy, we present the multivariable control
system.
3.1 Applicability Issue
As shown in (LP2), in order to solve the linear programming prob-
lem and obtain the optimal bidding strategy, we need to know
exactly the information of every ad opportunity of the day, includ-
ing the winning price, CTR and CVR. Such information, however,
could not be obtained in real world until the end of the day, while
the optimal bidding strategy need to be determined before the
campaign starts. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to estimate
all of them in the impression level precisely before the campaign
starts[28, 32, 37], how to predict the ad opportunity itself of the day
is still an open question due to the dynamic environment[25]. One
Figure 3: A block diagram of the feedback control system
may argue that there are many statistical algorithms proposed to
solve such a problem: the optimal solution could be derived from
sufficient historical data and be applied in the future. One strong
assumption made in such algorithms is that the distribution of the
variables are stationary. However, the distribution of not only the
ad opportunities, but also other factors such as the winning price,
CTR and CVR are not stationary in the dynamic RTB environment.
Therefore, the optimal bidding strategy derived on historical data
becomes no longer optimal for future, and may even break the CPC
constraint.
3.2 Feedback Control-based Solution
As discussed in the last section, due to the dynamic bidding environ-
ment, the bidding strategy we derive on the historical data may be
unreliable. Therefore, we need to leverage the real-time information
to adjust the bidding strategy. Feedback control, which deals with
the dynamic systems from feedback and outside noise[15], is widely
adopted in the industry because of its robustness and effectiveness.
A feedback control system is to achieve desirable performance by
adjusting the system input based on the feedback of the system
output. In our scenario, we could naturally integrate the bidding
strategy and the RTB environment as a dynamic system, and regard
the hyper parameters of the bidding strategy p and q as the input of
the system. By doing so, the problem is transformed into a feedback
control problem. There is still one problem: what is the desirable
performance, and consequently what feedback of the output should
we care about? Firstly, we aim to maximize the advertising value
and control CPC. Secondly, in order to maximize the advertising
value, we should pace the budget spending to win the valuable ad
opportunities scattered across time[26]. Therefore, we need to pace
the budget spending, and control CPC simultaneously. We propose
the feedback solution as follows: to improve the advertising per-
formance, we pace the budget spending and control CPC based on
their real-time feedback.
We briefly introduce the standard feedback control system. A
block diagram of the feedback control system is illustrated as Fig.
3. The desired value of the ouput is called the reference, which is
pre-set depending on the specific task. The sensor measures the
actual value of the variable from the system output, and transmit
it to the controller. Comparing the measured value and the refer-
ence, the controller would adjust the input of the system by its
pre-defined algorithms or strategies to diminish the difference be-
tween them. Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller[4]
is the most widely adopted feedback controller in the industry. It
is known that a PID controller delivers best performance in the
absence of knowledge of the underlying process [3]. A PID con-
troller continuously calculates the error e(t) between the measured
value y(t) and the reference r (t) at every time step t , and produce
the control signal u(t) based on the combination of proportional,
integral, and derivative terms of e(t). The control signal u(t) is
then sent to adjust the system input x(t) by the actuator model
ϕ(x(0),u(t)). It is practical and common to use discrete time step
(t1, t2, ...) in online advertising scenario, so the process of PID could
be formulated as following equations, where kp , ki , and kd are the
weight parameters of a PID controller.
e(t) = r (t) − y(t) (13)
u(t) = kpe(t) + ki
∑
i=1...t
e(k) + kd (e(t) − e(t − 1)) (14)
x(t + 1) = ϕ(x(0),u(t)) (15)
3.3 Analysis on Hyper Parameters
We have transformed the problem into a feedback control problem,
and determined the dynamic system (the bidding strategy and RTB),
the input parameters (p and q), and the output variables (budget
spending and CPC) in last sections. The challenge is how to control
the budget spending and CPC simultaneously by adjusting p and q.
Due to the multiple input parameters and the multiple output vari-
ables, we cannot directly apply the PID controllers in our scenario
since such controllers are designed for the system with a single
input parameter and a single output variable. There has been some
multivariable control methods such as model predictive control [22]
proposed to deal with such a system, and we shall leverage their
underlying idea in our design in the next section. In this section,
we revisit the optimal bidding strategy in Eq. (11) and share our
ideas to design the multivariable control system.
We analyse how the hyper parameters p and q contribute to
the bidding strategy in Eq. (11). Please recall that p and q are dual
variables incorporated by the constraint (4) and (5) respectively, and
we explore their relationship with the corresponding constraint.
Fig. 4 shows the optimal bidding strategy with q fixed and p
respectively decreased, increased, equal to 0 and equal to∞. It is
worth noting that the bidding price would exactly influence the
expected cost: the higher bidding price leads to more cost since the
campaign may win more ad opportunities. As illustrated in Fig. 4,
the bidding price would be generally lowered or lifted as p increases
or decreases. When we increasep, the bidding strategy would rotate
clockwise around the point (−q ·C, 0). The resulting fact is that: the
bidding price that is above zero would be lowered, and the bidding
price that is below zero3 would be lifted, and thus the expected cost
would be lessened. Please take p = ∞ and p = 0 as the extreme
examples. The advertising campaign would never be charged when
its bid price constantly equals to zero with p = ∞. When p = 0, the
budget becomes no longer a constraint. The bidding price does not
become infinitely high because there is still a CPC constraint and
the slope of the bidding strategy is controlled completely by q. If
we simultaneously set q to be 0, which means the CPC constraint
also is removed, the bidding price would be infinitely high and
the campaign would win all ad opportunities. According to the
3Although the bidding price would never be a negative value, the analytic continuation
would help to comprehend the mathematics property.
(a) p decreased (b) p increased
(c) p = 0 (d) p = ∞
Figure 4: Bidding strategies with q fixed and p respectively
decreased, increased, equal to 0, and equal to∞. The dashed
line is illustrated as a reference to the original function.
(a) q decreased (b) q increased
(c) q = 0 (d) q = ∞
Figure 5: Bidding strategies with p fixed and q respectively
decreased, increased, equal to 0 and equal to ∞. The dashed
line is illustrated as a reference to the original function.
illustrations, we claim that p has a direct and effective control
capability on the budget spending, and could definitely lower the
budget spending speed.
In a similar way, we fix p and set q to be respectively decreased,
increased, equal to 0, and equal to ∞. As illustrated in Fig. 5, q’s
effects on the optimal bidding strategy is notably different to that
of p. When we increase or decrease q, the bidding strategy would
rotate clockwise or counter-clockwise around the the point (p ·C, C).
Taking increasing q for example, the bid price above C would be
lowered, and that below C would be lifted. Thus the campaign
would win more ad opportunities whose CPC is below C , and less
ad opportunities whose CPC is above C . The composite result is
Figure 6: Independent PID control system
that the CPC is more likely to be belowC . In the extreme cases, CPC
would be guaranteed belowC when q = ∞. When q is set to be zero,
which means the CPC constraint is removed, the bidding strategy is
determined by p and degenerates to the optimal budget-constrained
bidding strategy in [21, 29, 34]. Based on the analysis, we claim that
CPC could be definitely controlled by q. We propose the following
two statements:
(1) Hyper parameter p has a direct and effective control capability
on the budget spending, and the budget spending speed could
be definitely lowered by p given whatever value of q.
(2) Hyper parameter q has a direct and effective control capability
on CPC, and the CPC constraint could be definitely achieved by
adjusting q given whatever value of p.
3.4 Multivariable Control
As we state in the last section, the budget spending and CPC could
be definitely controlled by p and q respectively. In other words,
p and q could be used to control the budget spending and CPC
independently, and regard each other as outside noise. Therefore,
we could decompose the multivariable feedback control problem
into two single-variable feedback control problem. By doing so, PID
controllers could be easily deployed, and we propose the indepen-
dent PID design in Fig. 6, where and afterwards we slightly abuse
the subscript p and q to differentiate the two controllers.
To make a further step, we revisit the analysis in Section 3.3. As
illustrated in Fig. 4, increasing p would generally lower the bidding
price and reduce the budget spending speed. Another non-trivial
effect caused by increasing p is that the expected CPC would also be
lowered. According to such observations, adjusting p actually casts
influence on CPC. Similarly, adjusting q also casts influence on bud-
get spending. Although our independent PID control system could
deal with such coupling effect, which is treated as outside noise
by controllers, it is possible to further improve the performance of
the system by addressing such an issue. However, such coupling
effect is hard to be quantified and compensated since we have no
explicit knowledge of the dynamic system. In order to address such
a problem, we leverage the underlying idea of model predictive
control (MPC)[22] to predict and compensate the coupling effect.
It is worth mentioning that we do not directly apply MPC in our
control system since modelling the highly non-linear RTB environ-
ment is costly and even impractical. In our design, combined with
the human knowledge, the model predictive module needs only
to predict the coupling effect, which could be approximated by a
linear model. As illustrated in Fig. 7, a model predictive module
is deployed after PID controllers to regulate the control signal by
addressing the coupling effect.
Figure 7: Model predictive PID control system
One of the most important components of MPC is a model to
represent the behaviour of the dynamic system. In our case, we
model the bidding environment with respect to the cost and CPC
as shown in Eq. (16), where X is a 2 × 2 matrix and b is a 2 × 1
matrix. After we obtain the expected ∆cost and ∆CPC from the
feedback, we could adjust p and q by solving the equation in Eq.
(17), and derive the result as shown in Eq. (18). The formulation in
Eq. (18) demonstrates that the control signal of p and q should be
a linear combination of the changes of cost and CPC. Therefore,
we define the model predictive module by Eq. (19), where ∆cost
and ∆CPC are quantified by up (t) and uq (t) respectively, and [X]−1
is approximated by a 2 × 2 matrix determined by α and β . By
approximating [X]−1, we could simply regardα and β as twoweight
parameters and search their best value in the training set. Although
such an approximation undermines the capability to represent the
system, it makes the controller more robust and stable against the
changing environment. It is worth mentioning that we propose the
matrix X and b to model the dynamic system, however, the exactly
value of such matrices is not explicitly required. As shown in Eq.
(19), we take advantage of such matrices to address the coupling
effect, and obtain the approximated function determined by only α
and β . [
cost
CPC
]
=
[
X b
] 
p
q
1
 (16)[
∆cost
∆CPC
]
=
[
X
] [ ∆p
∆q
]
(17)[
∆p
∆q
]
=
[
X
]−1 [ ∆cost
∆CPC
]
(18)[
u ′p (t)
u ′q (t)
]
=
[
α 1 − α
1 − β β
] [
up (t)
uq (t)
]
(19)
4 EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experiments to demon-
strate our statements and the advantage of our multivariable control
systems. After describing the real dataset and related metrics, we
present the implementation details. Experiments are conducted on
the example campaigns to prove the the claimed control capability
of the hyper parameters. To show the superiority of our system,
we compare our methods with the state of the art in the industry
practices on a large group of campaigns.
4.1 Experiment Setup
4.1.1 Dataset. We base the experiments on the real dataset from
Taobao.com. The dataset consists of 40 advertising campaigns across
continuous days and totally 20M bid logs. It is split according to
the date as training dataset and test dataset. The key information of
the dataset from the perspective of a specific advertising campaign
could be summarized as Tab. 1. We mainly use the information of
the winning price, CTR and CVR. The winning price of each ad
opportunity corresponding to the specific campaign is recorded
after each online auction ends. Since Taobao.com is also a publisher,
the winning price could be observed even the advertiser missed the
ad opportunity in the online auction. CTR and CVR are estimated
by the online deployed models, which leverage extensive realtime
and historical information of the user and ads. Please refer to [37]
for details of the online deployed estimation models.
Table 1: Key information of the dataset
Key Description
opportunityi identity of the ad opportunity
timestampi arriving time of opportunityi
wpi winning price of opportunityi
CTRi estimated click-through rate of opportunityi
CVRi estimated conversion rate of opportunityi
4.1.2 Metrics. The goal of the bidding strategy and system is to
maximize the total value of the winning ad opportunities, and
control CPC under the given threshold. We quantify the advertising
value by the sum ofCTR ·CVR, which corresponds to the expected
outcomes of the conversion. It is worth mentioning that we regard
CTR · CVR as the value, instead of the actual conversion event,
to exclude the inaccuracy caused by the estimation models. Even
though some previous work evaluates the bidding strategy by the
actual conversions, we argue that the estimation error actually cast
non-trivial influence on the results. A campaignwith a fixed bidding
strategy may gain more clicks/conversions just by optimizing the
estimation models, so we regard CTR ·CVR as the true conversion
to diminish such influence.
(1) R represents the advertising value of the campaign.
(2) R∗ represents the maximum advertising value the campaign
could achieve with the budget and CPC constraints.
(3) R/R∗ could be used to evaluate how close the advertising per-
formance is to the ideal result.
(4) CPCratio is the proportion of the campaigns that satisfy the
CPC constraint (overshoot within 10% is allowed), which could
be used to evaluate the CPC control capability when comparing
different methods with each other on a large group of campaigns.
(5) Valueratio is the average R/R∗ on the campaigns whose CPC
constraint holds, which is to evaluate the advertising value
achievement. As for those campaigns that break the CPC con-
straint, we exclude their R/R∗ when we calculate Valueratio
since wining more value by breaking the CPC constraint is not
allowed in our scenario.
4.1.3 Implementation Details. We adopt the actuator shown in Eq.
(20) in the PID controllers and the baseline strategies, where the sign
of u(t) depends on the relationship between the input parameter
and the output variable. In addition, it needs to be noted that we
actually care about the accumulated CPC when the campaign ends,
and the real-time CPC of each time step contributes differently
to the accumulated CPC because the quantity of clicks in each
time step is different. The traditional PID error could not address
the different weight in our scenario, so we weigh the error by the
quantity of clicks and modify the control signal for q as shown
in Eq. (21) and Eq. (22), where u(t) is calculated by Eq. (14) and
click(t) represents the quantity of clicks in the time step t . By such
a modification, the PID controller would constantly increase its
attention on the accumulated CPC, and give each time step different
weights.
To determine the weight parameters of a PID controller, as well
as the weight parameters α and β , we grid-search the best setting
on the training dataset, and apply it on the test dataset. We regard
every one hour as a time step, so the maximum time step T equals
to 24.
x(t + 1) = x(0) · exp(−u(t)) (20)
eq (t) = click(t) · (r (t) − y(t)) (21)
uq (t) = 1∑
i=1...t
click(t)
· u(t)
(22)
As we discussed in last sections, the PID controllers need a
reference. In our experiments, CPC given by the advertiser is set as
the constant reference to control q. Considering the ad opportunity
and winning price, which have an immediate impact on the cost,
show different statistical characteristics across time steps, the cost
reference should be customized with respect to the time step. We
calculate the cost distribution on the training dataset, which is the
ideal cost of each time step normalized by the total cost of the day,
as the cost reference. Our experiment flow steps are as follows: 1)
optimal p and q are calculated on the training dataset; 2) the bidding
process is simulated on the test dataset, where the calculated p and
q are applied as the initial hyper parameters; 3) the simulation
would finish when the campaign runs out of budget or there is no
more ad opportunity.
4.2 Control Capability
In this section, we do experiments to demonstrate our statements
that budget spending and CPC could be independently controlled by
p and q. We adjust both hyper parameters simultaneously without
the model predictive module and illustrate the control performance
in terms of budget spending and CPC respectively on the example
campaign. The controlling performance is illustrated in Fig. 8 and
Fig. 9
As illustrated in Fig. 8, the cost of each time step controlled by
p fluctuates around the cost reference, and the accumulated cost
is well controlled referring to the accumulated cost reference. As
Fig. 9 shows, CPC of each time step gets quickly confined within
the tolerable margin, and the accumulated CPC is successfully
controlled under the given reference. It is worth mentioning that
the real-time CPC shows observable fluctuation across time steps
since the attention on the real-time CPC is gradually decreased in
our design. Comparedwith the real-time CPC, the accumulated CPC
delivers stable performance as illustrated in Fig. 9b. According to
the experiments, althoughp andq have interference with each other,
they could be independently adjusted to control the corresponding
output variables.
(a) Cost per time step (b) Budget spending
Figure 8: Control performance on budget spending. The cost
distribution is set as the cost reference.
(a) CPC per time step (b) Accumulated CPC
Figure 9: Control performance on CPC. The CPC reference
is set to be 200, and the ±10% interval around the reference
value is defined as the tolerable margin.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we compare our approach with the state of the art in
the industry. We first introduce our baseline strategies, and evaluate
all of them on the real-world dataset.
4.3.1 Baseline Strategies.
(1) Cost-min: Cost-min[14] is a generic algorithm to address mul-
tiple constraints in advertising scenario, and could be applied in
our scenario as follows. The bidding strategy Eq. (23) is adopted.
We adjust b0 by a PID controller according to the cost reference,
and set the upper bound of c_bidi to be C . The CPC constraint
of the advertising campaign would always hold with Cost-min
because of the truncated bid price. We divide the given CPC by
the averaged CVR on all bid logs of the campaign to initialize
b0.
(2) Fb-Control: Zhang et al. proposed a feedback control mecha-
nism that dynamically adjusts the bids to control CPC[34]. In
their work, they adopted the generalised bidding strategy, which
is shown in Eq. (24), and constantly adjust b0 by a PID controller
according to the feedback of CPC. The given CPC is set as the
initial value of b0. For simplicity, we reference their method as
Fb-Control.
(3) Fb-Control-M: Fb-Control does not consider the value of a
click (i.e. CVR), which is important to improve the advertising
performance. Therefore, we modify their bidding strategy to
better fit into our scenario as shown in Eq. (23), where b0 is
adjusted by a PID controller according to our cost reference, and
the upper bound of c_bidi is controlled by an independent PID
controller according to the feedback of CPC. The upper bound,
initialized by the given CPC, would truncate c_bidi every time
c_bidi exceeds the value, and b0 is initialized in the same way
with Cost-min.We reference the modifiedmethod as Fb-Control-
M.
c_bidi = b0 ·CVRi (23)
c_bidi = b0 (24)
4.3.2 Experimental Results. We reference our independent PID
control system as I-PID, and the model predictive PID control
system asM-PID for simplicity. We compare I-PID and M-PID with
strategies introduced in the last section on the real-word dataset,
and the result on 40 test campaigns is shown in Tab. 2.
Table 2: Evaluation results
Method CPCratio Valueratio
Cost-min 1.0 0.362
Fb-Control 1.0 0.549
Fb-Control-M 1.0 0.709
I-PID 1.0 0.892
M-PID 1.0 0.928
As illustrated in Tab. 2, all methods could guarantee the CPC
constraint, while Cost-min achieves the least advertising value.
It is because Cost-min controls CPC greedily and excessively by
simply truncating the price, which would lose many valuable ad
opportunities. Fb-Control and its modified version, as well as our
approaches, also show excellent control capability on achieving the
CPC constraint. However, Fb-Control and Fb-Control-M achieved
generally lower value than I-PID and M-PID. The key reason is
that their generalised bidding strategy is not optimal to address the
budget spending and CPC constraint simultaneously. Fb-Control-M
obtains a better result than Fb-Control, and justifies our modifica-
tion. Our approach I-PID outperforms all baseline strategies. M-PID
performs even better than I-PID, since the coupling effect is ad-
dressed in M-PID and thus the controllers could behave in a more
coordinated way. To sum up, compared with the state of the art
in the industry practices, our multivariable feedback control sys-
tems deliver excellent control capability on the CPC and superior
advertising performance in our scenario.
5 RELATEDWORK
The bid optimization problem is a very actively studied problem
in real-time bidding[18, 23, 36, 38], and several formulations and
algorithms have been proposed in the display advertising scenario.
Authors of work [6, 29, 35] proposed models to maximize adver-
tising value within the budget, where the KPI constraint is not
considered. Some work has been proposed to specifically address
the KPI constraint such as [10, 34]. Little work in diaplay advertising
focuses on advertising value and KPI constraints simultaneously.
Kitts et al. introduced a generic bidding framework to take into
consideration of the advertising value and multiple KPI constraints
in [14]. Our work is similar to [14], however, we focused on the
specific KPI constraint and proposed a more delicate strategy. In
our work, we abstracted our problem as a linear programming prob-
lem and leveraged the primal-dual method. Such an approach is
generally applied in the ad allocation scenario [2, 7, 11]. Different
from their work, our work adopted this approach to derive the
optimal bidding strategy instead of the allocation strategy. To ad-
dress the dynamic environment, we took advantage of the feedback
control theory, which has been proved effective in many scenarios
by work of [12, 13, 34]. Other related work includes click-through
rate estimation[19, 37], conversion rate estimation[17, 32], winning
price prediction [28, 30] and budget pacing[16, 31].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on the bidding strategy to maximize the ad-
vertising value with the budget and the KPI constraint. We convert
such a problem into a linear programming problem and leverage
the primal-dual method to derive the optimal bidding strategy. The
hyper parameters of the bidding strategy is investigated and their
relationship with the corresponding constraint is illustrated. It is
demonstrated that the hyper parameters have strong control ca-
pability on achieving the constraints. Based on our analysis, we
propose a feedback control-based solution and design the indepen-
dent PID control system to address the dynamic environment. To
compensate the coupling effect among variables, we further devise
the model predictive PID control system by deploying a model
predictive module. Extensive experiments are conducted, and our
approach is compared with the state of the art in the industry on
real-world dataset. The results show that our multivariable con-
trol systems deliver superior advertising performance with the KPI
constraint holding.
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